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PART I:PRIVATE LAW
TORTS
by
Page Keeton*
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Causation. When plaintiff seeks to recover in any kind of situation on a
theory of negligence, and the ground of negligence is that the defendant failed
to do something that he ought to have done, a causal question is whether the
action that he should have taken would have prevented the harm. The issue
is not what did happen but rather what would have happened if proper action
had been taken! It was this principle of law that induced the following observation which this writer made some time ago:
There is a fundamental difference in the factual causation issue between
negligence in the sale of a defective product per se and negligence in failing
to give adequate warnings or instructions about the dangers of a good product. As to the former, proof by the plaintiff that harm flowed from a condition or ingredient that made the product unreasonably dangerous would establish causal connection in fact. As to the latter, the aspect of the defendant's
conduct that made the sale of the product unreasonably dangerous must be
found to have contributed to the plaintiffs injury ....

There has as yet been

no indication that causation issues will be resolved in any different manner
under a strict liability theory from the way such issues have been resolved
when recovery has been sought on a negligence theory
The question whether causation will be treated any differently under strict
liability than under negligence theory has now been answered by the Supreme
Court of Texas in Technical Chemical Co.. v. Jacobs.' The plaintiff in that
case suffered injury when a can of freon coolant exploded after he had mistakenly connected it to the high pressure side of his car's air conditioner rather
than to the low pressure side. The jury found that the product was unreasonably dangerous because the manufacturer failed to warn of this hazard. Since,
however, there was some evidence that the plaintiff never looked at the can,
the jury found that the absence of the warning did not cause the accident, and
the trial court entered judgment for the defendant. This judgment was reversed by the court of civil appeals.4 The court of civil appeals took the position that, despite what the rule as to negligence might be, when strict liability
is involved, if harm resulted from the risk or hazard about which the manufacturer failed adequately to warn, the manufacturer would be liable. Alternatively, the court held that in the event causation was not established as a
B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean, University of Texas

School of Law.

'East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1970); Keeton, Torts,

Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 SW. L.J. 1, 6 (1971).

'Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEXAs L. REV. 398, 413
(1970).
8480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
'Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.) 1971).
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matter of law, on the theory that an adequate warning would not have been
heeded, then the jury finding should be regarded as against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence. The supreme court held that it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the existence of a warning would have prevented the injury and remanded the case for retrial pursuant to the alternative
holding of the court of civil appeals. But in so holding, the court recognized
the difficult problem of proof and indicated that the plaintiff ought to have
the benefit of a presumption.! With such a presumption available, the plaintiff would not in most instances be denied a recovery as a matter of law.
Another solution would be to place the burden of persuasion that the warning
would not have been successful on the defendant who failed to give adequate
warning. This is perhaps just another way of saying that the affinity of causal
likelihood between the aspect of the defendant's conduct that subjects the
defendant to liability and plaintiff's harm should not necessarily be the same
for all kinds of problems.' In the situation of a failure to warn, the plaintiff
should recover if there is a substantial likelihood, based on the evidence, that
the warning would have been effective. If this principle were adopted and the
jury were so instructed, there would be no necessity for talking about presumptions or changing the burden of persuasion. Clearly, as the supreme
court indicated, situations will occur when it would seem to be ridiculous to
hold the manufacturer liable. More and more warnings are required to be
given as a consequence of public regulation, and this is as it should be. It
would seem reasonably clear that if the only basis for recovery against the
defendant is the fact that he did not take adequate precautions to warn users,
a user who had knowledge of that about which the manufacturer was supposed
to warn him should not recover. Warnings are often required out of an
abundance of caution in order to prevent the occasional uninformed user from
being subjected to a risk of which the vast majority of users would be aware,
as for example, the warning about the dangers of cigarette smoking.
The Meaning of Defect in Design. While the language of strict liability in
tort or breach of warranty is often used in describing the liability of a manufacturer for harm resulting from the way products are designed, no court has
ever imposed liability on the manufacturer of a product simply because the
product, when properly used, involved a substantial and serious risk of harm
to the user. Many highly useful products have inherent dangers from proper
and reasonably foreseeable uses.
The courts have used two theories of recovery in cases involving defective
designs. The theories are implied warranty and strict liability in tort. It is
submitted that the time is long overdue for the submission of a case to the
jury on one theory of recovery. Sometimes, lack of efficiency in the administration of personal injury litigation is due to the ambiguities of the substantive law rather than deficiencies in court organization and procedure. In com'The court cited a note making this su gestion. See Note, Plaintiff Need Not Establish
Causal Link Between Failure To Warn and lnjury, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 577 (1972).
6Keeton, supra note 1; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60
(1956).
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menting on Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Morrison two years ago, this
writer suggested that the Uniform Commercial Code, as passed in Texas,'
should be used to decide when to shift intangible economic losses resulting
from inferior or poor quality products.! When dealing with problems related
to physical harm arising out of damaging events produced by the dangerous
characteristics of products, the Code should be ignored because it is not helpful and was not intended to be exclusive. The Code does authorize recovery
for physical harm as consequential damages from a breach of warranty when
such damage proximately results from a breach of warranty. ° Since anything
can be done under the phrase, "proximately results," it is jurisprudentially
sound to ignore the Code and proceed to the development of a compensation
system, independent of the Code, for dealing with losses from physically harmful events that are attributable in part to dangerous products. So, the only
theory that should be recognized is the tort theory.
There have been three main tests used by the courts to identify a defect,
and two of the three can be attributed largely to the fact that many courts
used warranty theories initially in arriving at strict liability. The three tests are:
(1) A product is defective if it is not reasonably fit for its intended [ordinary] [or reasonably foreseeable) purposes. Two terms have been bracketed
because the courts have differed about the precise language used. The Code
uses "ordinary purposes.""1 This test of defect adequately describes the problem to the jury when the claim is for intangible economic losses resulting from
a lack of efficacy of the product to serve its purposes. Its usage, however, merely
serves to confuse and confound the jury when the issue is how dangerous
should the product be, and the claim is for damages attributable to a physically
harmful damaging event produced by the product.
(2) A product is defective if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be reasonably contemplated by intended [and reasonably foreseeable]
purchasers." This does speak to the issue-the dangerousness of the product.
But the ordinary consumer cannot be said to have expectations regarding the
safety of many features of the complicated products that are purchased, such
as the risk of fire from the way gasoline tanks are designed. This test is an
unclear way of saying something else-the third test.
(3) A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It
is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the
magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger, as it is proved to be at the
time of the trial, outweighs the benefits of the way the product was designed.
Under the heading of benefits one would include anything that gives utility
7455 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970). On remand the district court overruled defendant's plea of privilege and the court of appeals affirmed. 468
S.W.2d
505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1971).
8
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (1968).
9
Keeton, supra note 1, at 1-2.
' 0 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (1968).
11Id. S 2.314. The statement is as follows: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as . . . (3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965): "The article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."
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of some kind to the product; also one would include the feasibility and additional cost of making a safer product. There is no way of evaluating the utility
of a product from the standpoint of its dangerous characteristics without weighing risks against benefits."8
This much has been said to lead up to and express satisfaction with the
reasoning and holding of the court in Metal Window Products Co. v. Magnu-

sen.14 In that case, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the trial court
on both negligence and strict liability theories. The product was a sliding glass
door installed in an apartment. The door constituted the rear entrance to the
apartment and was the same type used in other apartments of the building.
The plaintiff attended a cookout at the apartment and had gone back and forth
through the door several times when it was open. The last time she started
through, however, the door had been closed and she struck it. It was urged
that the door was defective as designed and marketed because of the absence
of any decals or warnings that would put a person on notice when the door
was closed. The court held that the door was not unreasonably dangerous as
a matter of law, stressing three factors-the utility of transparency, the obviousness of the danger, and the ease with which users could supply decals to
guard against the obvious risk involved. The desire for a view, the "gracious
and spacious" concept and the "indoor-outdoor" feeling that transparency gives
are esthetic considerations that cause people to want glass doors, even with the
risk that is inherent in them." Hopefully, decisions of this nature will produce
instructions to the jury asking the jury to make this kind of an evaluation of
products, and thus trials will be simplified by eliminating negligence theories
and other tests such as those mentioned above.
I. MALPRACTICE IN THE RENDITION OF
MEDICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

Standard of Care. The standard of care applicable to those engaged in the

rendition of professional services, the kinds of experts that can be used as
witnesses, and the nature of the testimony that is admissible from experts are,
of course, all interrelated questions. There has been a growing amount of dissatisfaction with some of the orthodox rules pertaining to these matters. More-

over, litigation against hospitals, doctors, and others in the health service area
is increasing. This increase in litigation is no doubt attributable in part to the

elimination of all charitable immunites and to the erosion of governmental
immunity." The increase in litigation and the dissatisfaction with certain principles that have been obstacles to recovery will surely mean changes in the
law and some uncertainty for a time, not unlike that which has occurred in
the area of products liability. Massachusetts recently abandoned the "locality"
"1Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1969); Helene Curtis Indus.,
Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1968). In both of the opinions by the Fifth
Circuit, it was said that "demanding that the defect render the product unreasonably dangerous reflects a realization that many products have both utility and value."
14485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1972).
11
Id. at 358.
"See Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 SW.2d 530 (Tex. 1966); Keeton,
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 3, 7 (1972).
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rule and stated that a medical doctor would be required to use the care and
skill of the ordinary doctor, taking into account the advances in the profession."' It has been held in New York that adherence to acceptable medical
practice in a given case is not the sole test of professional malpractice, and that
a physician must use his best judgment on the basis of whatever superior
knowledge and skill he has." And in Minnesota the supreme court recognized
that almost anyone who occupies a position that makes him familiar with the
practices and procedures followed by a particular kind of doctor can be qualified as an expert for the purpose of testifying as to customary practices of
doctors of that kind." In that case a five-year-old child suffered serious deformity in her arm as a result of a rare contraction of the muscles in the arm
following treatment by the defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, for a fracture.
The question was whether the defendant placed too tight a cast upon the
plaintiff's arm. An accredited specialist in internal medicine was not allowed
to testify. While the court upheld the action of the trial judge, it did so not
because an internist can never give evidence against an orthopedic surgeon,
but rather because the trial judge was justified in concluding that the internist
had inadequate knowledge of orthopedic practices to give authoritative answers.
Now, the Supreme Court of Texas in Webb v. Jorns has held that the
locality or community practices in the medical and health area are not necessarily conclusive on the question of whether such practices will satisfy the requirements of due care. This could be a highly significant opinion. In Webb
a patient, who was admitted to a Fort Worth hospital for the repair of a
diaphragmatic hernia, died thirteen minutes after commencement of the administration of an anesthetic by a nurse anesthetist. An anesthesiologist from
Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, a medical specialist, testified at the
trial that the nurse anesthetist did not follow certain practices and procedures
that she should have followed. It was defendant's contention, in support of an
instructed verdict, that this testimony should be disregarded simply because of
the anesthesiologist's lack of qualifications to testify to community practices
and procedures. His testimony was that "there are certain minimum safe and
accepted practices and procedures that cannot vary in any locality or between
nurses and anesthesiologists, since the human tolerance to certain conditions
are uniform and apply to all persons wherever they may be. He said that all
teaching of anesthetics involves standards, below which no technician or practitioner should fall and that Mrs. Eakin's [the nurse] negligent acts did not
conform with those minimum standards.""1 The court held that the testimony
would support a finding of negligence. This could be the forerunner of a fundamental change in the substantive law for the standard of care applicable to all
professionals. The standard of care as it normally has been articulated is the
care customarily exercised by a doctor or technician of like kind in the same
"7 Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). See also Douglas v.
Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968).
"Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440
(1968) (a 4-3 decision).

"Swanson

v. Chatterton, 281 Minn. 129, 160 N.W.2d 662 (1968).
20488 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1972), rev'g 473 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971).
21488 S.W.2d at 411.
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or similar communities. ' Moreover, the expert that has been allowed to testify
has been required, generally speaking, to testify in terms of what was customary and not in terms of what he thinks ought to have been done. In Snow
v. Bond' the court observed that a medical doctor is not competent to express
an opinion about whether a doctor in a particular case acted negligently; rather
he should testify as to standards of practice and procedure that are customarily
followed. This rule was also adopted with respect to what a doctor has been
required to disclose to a patient regarding the risks and dangers of a particular
surgical procedure.' According to Webb, the doctor's testimony to the effect
that the nurse ought to have followed a certain procedure is admissible because
nurses are taught that this ought to be done. The problem which remains is
how to articulate the standard of care to the jury to define ought. Custom has
never fixed the standard of care for business practices generally,' but no doubt
this difference between business and professional practices has been based on
the notion that while courts and juries are competent to evaluate the ethical
quality of customs in business when, at least, expert evidence is introduced to
show that there were safer and feasible ways to act, the same is not true for
professional practices. It may be argued that an explanation to the jury of the
risks and dangers of alternative courses of action in the professional area would
be virtually impossible. But an alternative would be to allow the expert to
testify to what he thinks the person ought to have done in the light of the
information and knowledge that has been made available to him.
No one would suggest that a technician or professional should be expected
to exercise any more skill or knowledge than that which he holds himself out
as possessing, and a nurse-anesthetist cannot be expected to have the skill and
knowledge of a doctor-anesthesiologist. Without being definitive about the
matter, the following is suggested as a possible standard or charge to the jury:
Negligence of a nurse or other professional is the failure to exercise ordinary
care in the exercise of the skill and knowledge customarily possessed by such
a person [in the same or similar communities]. This simply means that allegedly inadvertent or unethical conduct on the part of professionals is to be
judged in the same way as it is for drivers of cars. There is a universal standard
of reasonable or ordinary care for such matters. This seems to be rather close to
a statement in Webb that "[the community standard does not require a small
office of a rural medical practitioner to possess either the skills or equipment
of a sophisticated clinic; but the standard demands, at least, that one must
exercise ordinary care commensurate with the equipment, skills, and time
available.""M
Causation, In Webb the plaintiff offered evidence from the anesthesiologist
that, if believed, eliminated all but two possible causes of the patient's death,
- King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969); Snow v. Bond, 438 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1969); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
28438 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1969).
" Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967), discussed in Keeton, Torts, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 4, 6 (1968).
"Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955); The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
8 488 S.W.2d at 411 (emphasis added).
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and both of the possible causes were negligent acts of the nurse-anesthetist.
The testimony as to causation was that death was attributable to one or the
other of the negligent acts. The defendants urged as one reason for denying
recovery that this evidence failed to establish causation because there was no
evidence to show which of the particular grounds of negligence was more
likely than not the cause of death from a cardiac arrest. But the evidence, if
believed, did establish that negligence of the nurse was more likely than not
the cause, and it was held to be unnecessary to prove which of the two negligent acts it was. Two observations should be added. The first is that the holding cannot logically be limited to the malpractice area. The second is that this
will necessarily affect the proper way to submit the causation question to the
jury in any situation in which the plaintiff relies on evidence of a kind that
would indicate that one or the other of two or more negligent acts was more
likely than not the cause of a damaging event.
III.

DEATH OR INJURY TO SPOUSE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
OF THE OTHER SPOUSE

When a wife or husband is injured, and the injury is proximately caused by
the actionable negligence of a third person, there are often two causes of
action-the cause of action of the injured spouse and the cause of action of
the non-injured spouse on the ground that the injury interfered with a relational interest of husband and wife. This legally protected interest in the
husband and wife relationship has generally been described as the right of
consortium." The items of damages recoverable for an injury when that injury
is to a single, emancipated person are pain, suffering, expenses, and loss of
earnings. The items or elements attributable to the interference with the relational interest of husband and wife are loss of services, society, and sexual
intercourse,' with loss of services being regarded initially as indispensable to
the cause of action. For reasons that will not be explored here, until recently
the common law recognized only a right of consortium on the part of the
husband to the wife and did not recognize a similar right on the part of the
wife to the husband." The major break came in 1950, and most jurisdictions
that have passed on the question since that date now provide for equality of
the sexes.' This is as it should be.
There are no major problems regarding recovery of the various items of
damages to the husband and wife when one of them is injured and neither
contributes to that injury through contributory negligence. But when negligence of the non-injured spouse proximately causes the damaging event in
which the other is injured, and in a state such as Texas where the community
271 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.9 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 889 (4th ed. 1971).
28Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Shreve v. Faris, 144 W. Va.

819, 111 S.E.2d 169 (1959).
2" W. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 894. The main reason for the denial of the wife's recovery was that while the husband was regarded as being entitled to the domestic services
of the
wife, she was not entitled to his.
'0 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cit. 1950); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451
S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239
N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
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property system has been adopted, there are complications. This area of the
law is further confounded by the fact that many states have totally or partially
abandoned family immunities, thus making it possible for the injured spouse
to recover against the negligent spouse as well as a third person.81 This would
also seem to lead to the result that a third person against whom a judgment
is rendered could obtain contribution from the negligent spouse. Heretofore,
that would not have been possible because contribution was not available to
one tortfeasor from another, unless the latter was also liable to the plaintiff as
a joint tortfeasor. Community of liability generally has been regarded as a
prerequisite to recovery." It is to be noted that this liability for contribution
by a negligent spouse would not of itself prevent the family enterprise from,
in effect, recovering all losses suffered by the injured spouse if the negligent
spouse was insured against liability.
Arguably, the husband and wife, although clearly not one, should have
been treated as an economic or financial unit with respect to the recovery of
damages from a third person. But the adoption of such a principle would have
meant, so long as contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery, that
there would have been no recovery for any of the items of damages arising
out of the damaging event. This would mean that, because of the concept of
inter-spousal immunity, the use of liability insurance would not be effective to
avoid a private family disaster when the husband or the wife is injured through
the negligence of the other and a third person. In any event, the courts have
held in separate property states that the negligence of the non-injured spouse
is not imputable to the injured spouse to bar recovery against a third person,"3
although, of course, it did bar recovery of the negligent spouse's losses resulting from the interference with the right of consortium.' The truth is, however, that realistically the negligent spouse normally benefits about as much
from any recovery obtained by an injured spouse in a separate property state
as in a community property state, and the rules of tort law should be adapted
to the family enterprise with that fact in mind. If, therefore, the rule against
imputation of negligence is sound, arguably it should also have been adopted
in community property states. But this has not been done in Texas. The cause
of action that came into existence upon injury of a spouse has been regarded
for many years as property acquired after marriage, and since it was not acquired by gift, devise, or descent it was regarded as community property.'
The further principle adopted was that the negligence of the non-injured
spouse barred recovery because he or she would share in the proceeds. This
3'Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); W. PRossER, supra
note 27, at 859.
3 Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1969); H.M.R. Constr. Co. v. Wolco,

Inc., 422 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1967), error ref. n.r.e. See

also Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Plaintiff was injured by
the concurrent negligence of her husband and a cab driver. The cab company paid a judgment and then was denied contribution from the husband on the grounds that a right of

contribution arises from a joint liability and the husband was not liable to the wife in tort
at common law.)

Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAs L. Ray. 161, 176 (1935).
Kimpel v. Moon, 113 N.J.L. 220, 174 A.2d 209 (Super. Ct. App. 1934); Lowery v.
Berry, 153 Tex. 411, 209 S.W.2d 795 (1954).
"
34

35G.C. & S.F. Ry. v. Greenlee, 62 Tex. 334 (1884); Texas Cent. Ry. v. Burnett, 61
Tex. 638 (1884); Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883); see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
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latter proposition was never a logical necessity. The fact that the negligent
spouse has a joint interest in the recovery is hardly a necessary reason for barring the family unit of all recovery, especially if the legal right to management
and control of the recovery would be in the injured spouse.
Pain and Suffering. Effective January 1, 1968, the legislature passed a statute
providing that the spouse's separate property consists of "the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during the marriage, except any recovery
for loss of earning capacity during marriage."" In Graham v. Franco the supreme court held that "independent of the statute . . . recovery for personal
injuries to the body of the wife, including disfigurement and physical pain
and suffering, past and future, is separate property of the wife."'" In so holding,
the court overruled prior decisions based on what the court considered to be
dictum in Ezell v. Dodson.' The monetary recovery for pain and suffering is
a replacement for the sound body that was brought into the marriage; it was
not acquired as a result of effort; and the property once acquired must therefore be regarded as separate or personal to the injured spouse since it takes
its character from the nature of the right violated. Therefore, the husband's
negligence did not bar the wife's recovery for pain and suffering on the basis
that he would legally share in the recovery. Having held that the recovery for
pain and suffering was separate property, the court followed the prevailing
view that the husband's negligence would not be imputed to the wife simply
because of the family relationship." '
Expenses, The damages that are recoverable by an injured party which represent economic losses, expenses, and lost earnings were regarded by the
supreme court in Graham as community property. As for expenses, the conclusion was that the recovery is not to replace a sound body but is rather
to reimburse the community property, the idea being that it is the primary
legal responsibility of the community to pay for expenses. The court specifically stated that no opinion was expressed about the result that would be
reached if the expenses were paid from the separate funds of the injured
spouse. As has already been stated, the fact that a negligent spouse has a joint
interest in the recovery is hardly a necessary reason for barring the family
unit from all recovery. The fact that contributory negligence bars recovery
when the recovery is entirely that of an injured party does not necessarily
mean that it should bar all recovery of an injured spouse simply because the
negligent spouse would have a joint legal interest in it. The effect is to penalize the innocent injured spouse as well as the negligent spouse. The law could
have been that the cause of action for personal injury is a personal right, unrelated to the character of the recovery after it is obtained, and, therefore, con"6Ch. 309, S§ 1, 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 736 (codified at TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1,

S 5.01 (Supp.1972)).
37 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).

"60 Tex. 331 (1883); see text accompanying note 35 supra. The court seems to have
been much influenced by the thoughtful article by Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 TEXAS
L. REV. 461 (1948).
3See note 33 supra, and accompanying text.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

tributory negligence of one spouse would not bar recovery of any of the items
of damages of the injured spouse. The problem of expenses is a difficult one
even in separate property states, especially when the wife is the injured spouse
and the husband has a common law obligation of maintenance and care. In
a well reasoned opinion in which the court considered various problems related to this question, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held, overruling a
prior decision, that the right to recover should not depend upon the irrelevant
circumstance that the wife did or did not incur the bill.' Under that view only
the uninformed would make the mistake of using the husband's credit or resources. The court went on to say something that is relevant in a community
property state: "We think it better to say the claim for medical, past and future, is the wife's; that the tortfeasor can have no interest in whether the medical demands were or will be met by the wife or by her husband; and that any
controversy between the husband and wife in that regard is a matter for adjustment by them alone."4
It is difficult to arrive at any conclusion other than that the recovery of lost
earnings is community property since the recovery is to provide for what would
have been earned. But this recovery would be under the management and
control of the injured spouse-the wife in Graham-and the use of the contributory negligence doctrine to bar all recovery penalizes the innocent spouse
as well as the negligent spouse.
The doctrine that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery
appears to be on the way out. If and when comparative negligence or something similar is substituted, the problems here discussed will need to be reexamined. Perhaps the family should then be treated as an economic or
financial unit or, if not, there should be a reexamination of interspousal immunity. Property concepts should not be controlling and the rules for recovery should be the same in community and separate property jurisdictions.
In Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc.' the mother of two children was
killed in a collision that was proximately caused by the negligence of her
husband and a third person. The accident occurred prior to the passage of
the statute providing that a spouse's recovery for personal injuries would be
separate property.' The court of civil appeals thought that it would be highly
inappropriate for an intermediate court to entertain an argument that the
long-standing construction of the wrongful death statute denying the innocent
children a recovery was unconstitutional. Thus, the children were not allowed
a recovery because at the time of death the mother could not have recovered
had she lived, since the recovery would have been community property. As a
result of the holding in Graham, the mother can now recover for pain and
suffering. Moreover, the fact that the accident occurred prior to the passage
of the provision making the recovery separate property is immaterial because
the supreme court held that independent of the statute the recovery would be
separate property. The court is now in a position to do what Professor Green
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Patusco v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 50 N.J. 365, 235 A.2d 465 (1962).
A.2d at 469.
4'470 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), rev'd, 489 S.W.2d
279 (Tex. 1973).
48TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, S 5.01 (Supp. 1972).
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urged many years ago." It is in a position to allow recovery to the survivors
who are not negligent. The items of recovery on behalf of a minor child
clearly include loss of services and loss of maintenance and support and other
pecuniary contributions.' Because of the husband-father's negligence, had the
wife lived she could not have recovered for lost earnings and the family
enterprise could not have recovered for lost services. Based on this fact the
argument can be plausibly made that the construction previously applied to
the wrongful death statute should preclude a recovery by the children of those
items of damages. If so, the cause of action would be virtually worthless. But
death, not injury, creates the cause of action in behalf of the children. In
fact, injury without death is not a basis for a cause of action in their behalf
in most jurisdictions. ' So the fact that the wife's cause of action would be of
a limited nature had she lived would seem to be totally irrelevant to the
amount of recovery on behalf of the children since their recovery is clearly
their separate property.*

' Green, supra note 38.
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY CHARGES, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN
JURY CHARGES 266 (1969). The explanatory instruction proposed is as follows: "You may
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consider the following elements and none other: care, maintenance, support, services, education, advice, counsel and contributions of pecuniary value that such children would in
reasonable probability have received from him during his lifetime had he lived." Id. S 12.02.
"Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 26 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hayrynen
v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich. App. 452, 157 N.W.2d 502 (1968); W. PROSSER,
.spranote 27, at 896.
* Editor's Note: After Dean Keeton had submitted this Article the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the court of civil appeals decision in Schwing, thus reaching the same result as
suggested in this Article. Schwing v. Blue Bonnet Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.
1973).

